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Abstract 
This paper analyses the outlook for regional funding under the next Multiannual Financial Framework 
of the EU for which the Commission has proposed new criteria. The starting point is the so-called Berlin 
formula, developed from a blend of national and regional indicators. In reality, the allocation for any 
region depends not only on the state of the region, but also heavily on the income level of the member 
state in which this region is located.  
The modifications to the Berlin formula proposed by the Commission would accentuate the importance 
of the national component, despite the fact that the EU cohesion policy is supposed to aim at lagging 
regions, not countries.  
Growth in Italy has been below the EU average for some time. This means that the poorer Italian regions 
should be entitled to a higher amount of cohesion policy funding. However, the increase one could 
expect on this count is limited given the modifications to Berlin formula proposed by the Commission. 
The application of the new formula would lead to a somewhat lower allocation for Italy overall 
(especially for the Mezzogiorno) for two reasons: i) Italy is still a relatively prosperous member state, ii) 
There are caps to the increase of cohesion policy funding to which regions can be eligible even if their 
relative income position has worsened a lot.  
Italian Universities and research institutes benefit less from EU funding than one would expect given 
the size of the Italian economy from competitive support for research and innovation programmes 
under Horizon 2020. This underperformance is not due to political decisions as the research funding of 
the EU is allocated strictly on scientific merit.  
In the area of research and innovation there is as well a strong north-south divide within the country. 
Creating high quality research institutions in the south might be a more promising way to use cohesion 
policy funds than building roads or railways. It should receive more attention and funding from national 
and EU policymakers.  
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EU budget over time: an overview 
Introduction 
The current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) will end in 2020. There is not a lot of time left to 
make substantial amendments to the proposal of the European Commission for the next MFF. It will 
have to be decided, at the latest, under the German Presidency in the second half of 2020 to avoid the 
controversial option of entering the provisional twelfths whereby the last year’s budget is disbursed in 
equal instalments month by month.  
It is already apparent that these negotiations will be at least as difficult as the previous ones. 
Representatives from the so-called ‘Hanseatic league’ of net contributors have already indicated that 
they are not willing to increase their net contribution to the EU budget, which would be necessary to 
plug the gap left by Brexit. The proposal published by the Finnish presidency in late 2019 represents one 
example of this.  
Moreover, there will be competition for cohesion spending between the new member states, whose 
growth has propelled them above certain thresholds for cohesion funding, and those countries/regions 
from the south of the euro area which have fallen behind. In addition, the negotiations in the Council 
are moving in a direction that deviates substantially from the European Parliament’s position, which has 
reached cross party agreement on the future of the EU budget and may refuse consent if the budget is 
not more ambitious. 
This paper will provide first a longer-term overview of the main elements of the EU budget. It then 
presents in more detail the distribution of regional funds under the so-called Berlin formula and the way 
changes to this key for the distribution of Structural Funds proposed by the Commission would affect 
cohesion funding. 
There are two ways to analyse the budget of the EU, which sometimes give a different picture because 
of the complicated process leading to actual spending. One can look at the funds which are allocated, 
in principle for 7 years; or one can look at the sums actually spent each year.  
The starting point for the budget process of the EU is the MFF, which provides an indispensable legal 
framework, mandated by the Treaty. In principle, it provides an overall cap to spending (usually 
expressed as a percentage of EU GNI) for the next 7 years and indications of the overall spending by 
broad categories. However, actual spending is then determined by the annual budgets, which 
sometimes diverge substantially from the patterns laid down in the MFF, especially if circumstances 
have changed in the meantime, for example, due to delays in the implementation of the new legislation 
and thus delays in commitments, or when a crisis materialises that requires expenditure by the EU 
budget. This has been the case during the last MFF, when emergencies led to a re-direction of unspent 
funds for new needs, such as migration or transfers of future commitments to earlier years to reinforce 
youth employment programmes. 
The variability of actual spending, relative to the one foreseen in the MFF is particularly pronounced for 
cohesion policy, i.e. the Structural Funds, the European Social Fund and Cohesion Fund. The reason for 
this is that disbursement under those funds requires the presentation and then implementation of 
detailed projects at the regional level. Planning, approval and then implementation take years. 
Projects and disbursements from the EU budget then come in tranches. This implies that actual 
Cohesion spending is rather variable and always extends beyond the end of the MFF. Under the so-
called N+2 or N+3 rule, funds can be disbursed up to two to three years after the formal end of the MFF, 
which is actually an improvement of the situation in multiannual frameworks before the rule was 
introduced, which offered no limit to the time for disbursements of committed amounts. Actual 
cohesion policy disbursements (payment commitments) fluctuate strongly due to the patterns of 
implementation, while annual commitment levels are rather linear.  
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Historically, payments have increased from about €25 billion per annum in the early 2000s (i.e. just 
before enlargement) to about a peak of close to €60 billion in 2012/13, but have since fallen back to 
below €30 billion in 2017. Preliminary data for 2018 indicate that cohesion spending has increased to 
about €55 billion as implementation of projects for the 2014-2020 period accelerated. These few figures 
illustrate the variability mentioned above. For longer comparisons one should go beyond the annual 
figures. 
Of course, these absolute values need to be read taking into account that the EU has enlarged from 15 
to (now) 28 members.  
Another factor making it difficult to pinpoint how much the EU does for its weaker members and regions 
is that support for cohesion from the EU budget can take many forms. Cohesion policy is composed of 
a number of different funds, i.e. the Cohesion Fund (CF), the Structural Funds (SF), composed of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). These are today 
clustered under one common regulation1 together with the European Fund for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (EARDF) and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) and form the European 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), thereby streamlining the policy and making it more coherent. 
But in addition to ESIF funding, the Common Agricultural Policy and several centrally managed funds 
can also intervene in those regions. Those comprise for example the Horizon 2020 policy or the use of 
supported equity and debt instruments from the competitiveness policy or the European Fund for 
Strategic Investments (EFSI) and channelled through national financial institutions or the EIB.   
This report, however, focuses solely on the Structural Funds (ERDF and ESF), which represent the main 
support instrument for regions lagging behind.  
The evolution of EU budget 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the EU budget over the last 18 years and the projections for the coming 
7 years. Values are expressed in 2018 prices in order to appreciate real variations.2 The solid lines 
represent actual payments provided to member states via the EU budget, while dotted lines are 
projections based on the proposal for the next programming period submitted by the Commission in 
May 2018.3 
  
                                                          
1 Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down 
common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying 
down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 
2 2% yearly inflation is assumed. 
3 Commission proposal, May 2018. 
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Figure 1: EU budget over time4 
 
Source: European Commission and authors’ elaboration. 
 
The budget of the EU has been under pressure since the Santer Commission scandal in 1999. At that 
time the budget ceiling was fully utilised at 1.20% of GNI. The pressure to limit it to 1% was the result 
of a steep fall in confidence both in the ability of the EU to manage resources properly, because of the 
scandals surrounding the Commission itself and the high error rates and unaccounted sums in EU 
support uncovered by the European Court of Auditors. Since then the EU budget has hovered around 
an average of 1.1 % of GDP. Some increases were driven by enlargement, but the impact of enlargement 
was moderate due to how the level of agricultural support was phased in for the new member states. 
They benefit from relatively low subsidies as they were calculated using average yields for 2000-2003, 
which was a period of weak production. Agriculture subsidies smoothly declined in the last programming 
periods and a further drop is foreseen within the coming MFF. This is mainly due to the fact that 
payments have been fixed in nominal terms, leading over time to a reduction in real terms. Structural 
funds do not exhibit any clear trend and are expected to remain almost unchanged, although there have 
been substantial fluctuations around the trend over time. Finally, “other” programmes have 
experienced a sustained growth which is programmed to culminate by their overtaking CAP funds in the 
coming MFF.  
Figure 2 provides an overall view in terms of the shares of actual EU spending disbursed (not the sums 
allocated under the MFF). It shows that the share of spending on agriculture has declined over recent 
decades from about 50% to 40% of the total whereas spending on Research and Development has 
increased from 4% to 8%. Cohesion spending has been more volatile. For the first ten years, i.e. between 
2000 and 2010/11 it remained roughly constant at slightly above 30% of total EU spending. This was 
followed by a peak towards the end of the last MFF (2013), when cohesion spending reached 40% of 
the total, followed by a fall to below 30% in 2017. It remains to be seen whether cohesion spending will 
pick up towards the end of the current MFF (i.e. in 2019/2020). The 2014-20 MFF had foreseen that 
each year between 2014 and 2017 the appropriations for commitments should be higher for cohesion 
spending than for agriculture, which would lead to increasing payments over time. The preliminary data 
for 2018 might thus lead to a spike similar to 2012/3.  
                                                          
4 See Appendix for clustering in CAP, SF, Other details. 
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Figure 2: EU budget over time – shares 
 
Source: European Commission and authors’ elaboration. 
 
Overall, if one analyses actual spending as opposed to official plans, it appears that cohesion has de 
facto maintained a roughly constant share of total EU spending (a bit below one third). The decline in 
the share of agriculture has been matched by an increase in other spending. Research and Development 
spending has roughly doubled its share, but it remains, at below 10%, much smaller than cohesion 
spending. 
 
The case of Italy 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the Italian situation vis-à-vis the EU budget. Net contributions from Italy 
to the EU budget have increased over time (red solid line), mirroring a decline in EU payments (green 
solid line). CAP transfers have followed a sustained and stable downward trend coherent with the EU-
whole picture. At a first sight, Structural Funds payments appear to have been declining slightly over the 
last 18 years. However, it is important to stress that Figure 3 plots real payments while disregarding 
allocations, which have been increasing in real terms.5 Moreover, despite the extremely volatile 
trajectory followed EU disbursement related to Structural Funds, a clear cyclical component is 
identifiable, which exhibits a substantial drop in the first years of each programming period followed by 
a sharp recovery in the last part of the MFFs. It is interesting to notice that the expected decline lagged 
two years in the MFF 14-20, reflecting the introduction of the n+2 rule. The share of “other” 
programmes has increased over time. If these trends remain relatively undisturbed, a fairly even 
distribution of EU funds should occur across the main categories of analysis during the next 
programming period. 
                                                          
5 See Appendix, Table 9. 
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Figure 3: EU payments to Italy6 
 
Source: European Commission and authors’ elaboration. 
 
As highlighted in Figure 4, the relative evolution of EU budget components in Italy roughly retraces the 
EU-wide trajectory. Although much smoother if compared to the EU average, there has been a drop in 
the share of CAP transfers and the cohesion policy funds also fell while the share of “other” programmes 
has increased.  
Figure 4: EU payments to Italy – shares 
 
Source: European Commission and authors’ elaboration. 
                                                          
6 2018 prices, 2% yearly inflation. 
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The rest of the paper will focus on the analysis of cohesion policy and especially on the R&D component 
of “other” programmes.  
Cohesion policy 
Cohesion policy is the European Union’s strategy to promote and support the “overall harmonious 
development” of its member states and regions. It, therefore, aims to foster a sustained convergence 
process. This policy objective is fixed in the Treaty and is generally accepted as a basic pillar of the EU. 
Cohesion policy is financed through the 3 main funds already presented, the ERDF, the ESF+ (both 
representing what are called Structural Funds) and the CF. The ERDF and ESF+ are allocated on a regional 
and project basis, while financing under the Cohesion Fund is transferred directly to member states.7  
The main objective of the Structural Funds is to foster convergence among EU regions. Convergence in 
the EU has improved, albeit with different degrees of success in different parts of Europe. Most regions 
in the new member states show rapid convergence, whereas some in the south have been lagging 
behind. Given the importance in terms of share of investment in the new member states of Structural 
Funds, there are strong arguments to say they are playing an important role. It is more difficult to 
separate the role of the EU funds on convergence where national public and social expenditure is much 
bigger and the EU contribution less prominent. This is the case in Italian regions. 
Looking at Figure 5, one finds a pattern of east-west convergence and north-south divergence. Regions 
in eastern Europe followed a robust catch-up path. But the maps also show an impoverishment in most 
southern regions, especially in Spain, Italy and Greece. What remains, for the time being, is a ‘bi-modal’ 
distribution: one finds a large number of regions between 75% and 90% and then above 105% of EU 
average GDP, but relatively few below but close to 100%. Another problem that has emerged and been 
exacerbated by the crisis, is an increased divergence also between economic centres within regions and 
the periphery.  
The Commission proposal represents an attempt to address the novel challenges raised by this uneven 
progress in convergence. 
                                                          
7 We do not consider other funds that could be deemed structural, such as EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund) and FIFG (Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance), EMFF (European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund), EAFRD (European Agricultural fund for rural development), YEI (Youth Employment Initiative). 
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Figure 5: The convergence process8 
                 
 
 
 
                                                                                
Source: Eurostat and authors’ elaboration. 
                                                          
8 Forecasts for 2024 are made assuming the economic growth rate of each region will be equal to the MS growth 
rate (source: WEO updated October 2019, GDP capita PPP). In order to ensure comparability over time, we assume 
no Brexit on these specific charts. 
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The future of Cohesion: a modified status quo? 
Fostering cohesion is a key aim of the European Union. A considerable part of the EU’s budget is thus 
devoted to the cohesion policy whose purpose is to provide lagging regions and countries with the 
means to catch up with the others. The new member states have benefitted from substantial allocations 
of ESIF funds since they joined in 2004/7. This applies in particular to the ‘Visegrád Four’, which have 
received between 2% and 3% of their GDP in cohesion policy funding, which has probably contributed 
materially to the catch-up process. 
In principle, EU cohesion support is destined mainly for “lagging regions”, i.e. those, with a GDP per 
capita (at PPP) below 75% of the EU average. Transition regions, i.e. those with a GDP per capita 
between 75% and 90% of the EU average and “more developed regions”, i.e. those with a GDP per 
capita over 90% of the EU average can also benefit, but with lower amounts and for a more restricted 
set of investment areas.  
The relative success of the Visegrád countries is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows that jump of 20 
percentage points (from 55% to 75% of the EU average) in the period 2000-2017. By contrast, the ‘old 
south’ (Portugal, Spain and Greece) has fallen back, from a position much ahead of the V-4 (over 83% 
of the EU average in 2000, to below 70% of the EU average and thus below the level now achieved by 
the V-4).  
Figure 6: GDP per capita at PPS as % of the EU average, Visegrád 4 vs ‘old south’.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO database. 
 
While this reversal of fortunes is likely to create further tensions for the negotiations of the next MFF, 
it also reveals that the use of the funds in the ‘old south’ or Mediterranean regions under convergence, 
may have been sub-optimal to achieve more resilient and diversified economies. It also may indicate 
national policy choices affecting the adaptability of the economy, e.g. Ireland not only grew quickly 
beyond the EU average, but also recovered faster from the crisis, aspects that should open a serious 
debate on structural aspects of development rather than the level or focus of EU funding. 
 
                                                          
9 V-4 = average of PL, CZ, HU and SK; Old south = average of EL, ES and PT 
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Differential situation and needs in the convergence regions 
The development needs of regions in the Mediterranean and the new member states are different, and 
the size of national budget for investment diverges. In the more advanced of the new member states, 
the needs for investment in infrastructure is higher and investments in those areas will still show higher 
returns. In some cases, the opportunity costs of building new infrastructure are very low, not requiring 
the substitution of existing operational systems, e.g. there can be a technological leapfrog effect in 
motion too. In the ‘old south’ a number of structural reform problems linger and investments in the 
‘knowledge economy’ and new business models need to take a higher priority. In terms of value, the 
impact of the funds is also very different due to the lower overall GDP and more limited size of national 
budgets (as the convergence process is based on purchasing power parity calculations, a similar GDP 
per capita for regional policy, measured in PPS, does not mean a similar nominal GDP).  
Figure 7 below shows that in the new member states the EU has co-funded around one half of all public 
spending on infrastructure. In Poland this ratio was even somewhat above 60 %, for the Czech Republic 
still above 40 % (although one has to keep in mind that these figures also include co-financing by the 
member state. While most new member states have benefitted from high amounts, they are not the 
only ones, as the highest relative contribution to public sector infrastructure can be found in Portugal. 
In Italy, by contrast, the ratio is only 12.8 %. This refers to the national average. If one looks at the poorer 
regions in Italy, the corresponding figure is higher, in some case more than three times higher, but would 
still remain below the values for the new member states because, as will be detailed below, poorer 
Italian regions receive less regional funding as they are located in a member state with a still relatively 
high average GDP per capita.  
Figure 7: Share of EU cohesion funding in total public spending on infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/Other/Share-of-Cohesion-Policy-per-Member-State-to-
publi/drqq-sbh7/data 
 
 
The effectiveness of EU cohesion spending to foster growth in lagging regions was for a long time a hotly 
contested issue, mostly for the spending in the EU-15.  
Many regions in the old member states have by now received Structural Funds for a long time (25 years 
and more), but have not converged. This is particularly the case in countries, which have experienced 
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an overall crisis, like Greece, which, over the last decades has fallen back from a GDP per capita of over 
85% of the EU average to about 67% today. Portugal has also fallen back, but by a smaller amount. Italy 
is a special case in that it did not need to apply for funding from the financial stabilisation instruments 
(EFSM or ESM), but its growth performance has, for almost a quarter of a century, been below that of 
the rest of the euro area and of the whole EU. 
By contrast, all of the new member states, have converged. At the present speed of convergence, new 
member states (and all of the Visegrád 4) would enter the transitional regime (between 75% and 100% 
of the EU average) during the next MFF based on their national averages. A key issue is whether this 
uneven catch-up is due to differences in national policies or to circumstances beyond the control of 
national governments. 
The Commission has argued that “The potential of the EU budget can only be fully unleashed if the 
economic, regulatory and administrative environment in the Member States is supportive. This is why, 
under the current Multiannual Financial Framework, all Member States and beneficiaries are required 
to show that the regulatory framework for financial management is robust, that the relevant EU 
regulation is being implemented correctly, and that the necessary administrative and institutional 
capacity exists to make EU funding a success.”10 
Conditionality on ‘good governance’ might thus be an important element of the new MFF. In the present 
MFF, for the first time ex ante conditionalities have been required. Countries whose regions are applying 
for support in specific sectors, need to be in line with the EU regulations and directives for the sector. 
The strategic requirements, monitoring and control have been updated and improved. The next MFF 
will see more emphasis on good governance, not only on the rule of law, but on conditionality with 
‘enabling conditions’,11 a further deepening of ex ante conditionalities, moving from formal compliance 
to effective implementation. 
The ‘Berlin formula’ 
Cohesion policy seems to have been successful in fostering convergence dynamics in the European 
Union for most regions, particularly the poorest, but the policy and link to structural reforms needs to 
be reinforced, given the uneven impact in different countries and the effect of the crisis. As presented 
in the first chapter, about a third of the EU budget, corresponding to roughly €40-50 billion per year, 
has been devoted to structural operations.  
To understand the allocation of the funds, it is important to check the methodology. In a meeting held 
in Berlin in 1999, the European Council set out a formula, now known as the ‘Berlin method’, to allocate 
Structural Funds to regions and member states in a rigorous and transparent manner.12 The formula 
was first adopted in the programming period 2000-2006 and has been modified ever since in each of 
the subsequent periods. In May 2018, the European Commission submitted a proposal suggesting few 
substantial adjustments to the Berlin method to allocate funds to regions within the coming multiannual 
budget. 
                                                          
10 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union's budget 
in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, COM(2018) 324 final. 
11 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund, and financial rules for those and for the Asylum and Migration Fund, the Internal 
Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument, COM(2018) 375 final 
12  “The new allocation method for the funds builds on the ‘Berlin formula’, adopted by the European Council in 
1999” https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_3866 
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Ultimately, the key drivers of cohesion funds allocation are regional income and socio-economic 
regional indicators (see Box 1). Convergence being the primary purpose of cohesion policy, the Berlin 
methodology ends up in allocating more resources to the worst performers. 
The formula proposed by the Commission for the coming programming period distinguishes three 
categories of regions (Table 1), each of whom are subject to different allocation criteria, for the 
allocation of ERDF and ESF resources, which, combined, represent the great majority of cohesion 
funding.13 The European regions are categorised as follows: 
1. Less developed regions (LDR) if their GDP per capita is less than 75% of EU-27 average,  
2. Transition regions (TR) if their GDP per capita is between 75%-100% of EU-27 average and  
3. More developed regions (MDR) if their GDP per capita is more than 100% of EU-27 average. 
However, LDR and TR are treated differently, depending on the GNI (not GDP) of the member state (MS) 
in which they are located, with three ‘buckets’: 
1. MS with a GNI per capita at PPS less than 82% of the EU-27 average,  
2. MS with a GNI per capita at PPS less than 99 % and more than 82% of the EU-27 average,  
3. MS with a GNI per capita at PPS above 99 % of the EU-27 average,  
The fact that national wealth is taken into account when allocating cohesion funds means that, ceteris 
paribus, a region in a richer member state will receive less resources than if it were to be part of a less 
developed country. Eventually, the proposed classification would end up creating 7 categories. 
Unfortunately, no justification is given for the precise numbers chosen to create these three buckets. 
Table 1: Number of regions in each bucket14 
 
Regional classification (based on GDP pc at PPS of 
region (% of EU average) Total 
Below 75% Above 75% < 100% Above 100% 
MS classification 
(based on GNI pc 
at PPS of 
country, (% of 
EU average) 
Below 82% 52 8 (6) 66 
Above 82% < 99% 16 19 (20) 55 
Above 99% 3 34 (80) 117 
Total 71 61 106 238 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat. 
 
While lagging regions tend to be part of poorer nations and richer regions tend to belong to wealthier 
member states, only a third of transition regions are part of transition countries; the majority of 
transition regions are located in wealthier member states. 
  
                                                          
13 In the present analysis we do not consider EARDF nor EMFF. The Cohesion Fund is allocated at member state 
level; hence it is not taken into account. 
14 Number of MDR are in parenthesis because their allocation is not affected by their respective national wealth. 
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Box 1: Berlin method explained – Commission proposal 
Less Developed Regions (LDR): 
 
1. Prosperity gap                                 𝛼 ∗ [𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ (𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑈 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛)] 
2. Unemployment                                  𝛽 ∗ [𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 − ( 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐿𝐷𝑅)]  
3. Youth unemployment                    γ ∗ [𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 − ( 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐿𝐷𝑅)] 
4. Low education rate                          δ ∗ [𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛25−64 ∗ (𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 −  𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐿𝐷𝑅)]   
 
Transition Regions (TR): 
 
1. Prosperity gap     𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ [(0.6 ∗ 𝛼 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑈 − 54) + (72 − 0.6 ∗ 𝛼 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑈) ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎% 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑈  
 
                                     
    
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
2. Unemployment, Youth unemployment, Low education rate bonuses apply in the same way as for the LDR 
 
More Developed Regions (MDR): 
 
Allocation of 18 EUR per total eligible population to be redistributed based on the relative regional share of**: 
 
1. Population (20%)                              𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
2. Unemployed (15%)                            𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 − ( 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑅) 
3. Employed (20%)                                𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛25−64 ∗ (𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑅 − 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
4. Early leavers (15%)                            𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛18−34 ∗ (𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑅) 
5. Tertiary educated (20%)                   𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛30−34 ∗ (𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑦 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑀𝐷𝑅 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
6. GDP (7.5%)                                         𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑅𝐷 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 
7. Population density (2.5%)               𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆3 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑝 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦< 12.5 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝑚2 
 
Bonus that apply to all regions 
 
1. Greenhouse gas emissions                 (national CO2 emissions2016 –  2030 emission target) ∗
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
 
2. Net non-EU migration                         400 ∗ [𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∗
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
] 
 
 **Different weights applied in parenthesis; *** All allocation are per year 
 
  
75 100 
0.6 * 𝛼 * (𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑈  -0.75* 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐸𝑈) 
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GDP capita, % of EU27 
average 
A 
B 
A = 60% of the allocation a LDR 
region whose GDP per capita is 
75% of the EU average would 
receive 
B = average per capita aid that a 
MDR would receive 
 linear interpolation between 
A and B to calculate per capita 
allocation for transition regions, 
whose GDP is between 75% and 
100% of EU GDP 
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Retracing the backbone of the formulae that drove Structural Funds allocation in the current 
programming period shows a number of substantial modifications in the methodology proposed by the 
Commission for the next MFF. The Commission proposes to change the criteria through which eligible 
regions are classified, the formulae to calculate regional allocations that apply to each of the above 
described buckets, and sets boundaries that constrain the maximum and minimum transfers than a 
region may receive.  
Regarding the first set of modifications, the Commission proposes to increase the upper limit for a 
region to be classified as ‘TR’, from 90% of average EU GDP per capita to 100%. As the Berlin method 
sets different criteria to calculate allocations based in regional groups, the proposed change will have 
clear implications for the regions that thus pass from being MDR to TR.15 Moreover, a reallocation of 
regions in different groups has other effects as it modifies the group averages (e.g. unemployment rate, 
education rate, employment rate, etc.). Given that the overall regional funds allocation depends on the 
regions’ performance relative to group/EU averages, different averages lead to diverse allocations. 
The maps in Figure 8 show the regional classification in the current programming period and present 
two scenarios for the future MFF. The central panel pictures the classification in the current criteria 
remaining unchanged, while the one on the right shows the regional classification under the proposed 
formula. Regions are coloured red if LDR, yellow if TR and green if MDR. France and Germany seem to 
be among the main beneficiaries of the revised methodology, as a relevant number of their regions 
would happen to be classified as TR, instead of MDR. 
Figure 8: Regional categorisation – scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat. 
 
The most prominent proposed modifications refer to the formulae that apply to each of the regional 
categories and can be summarised as in Figure 9. 
  
                                                          
15 See Box 1. 
MFF 2021-2027 
(Current Formula) 
MFF 2021-2027 
(Proposed Formula) 
MFF 2014-2020 
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Figure 9: More criteria and less weight on regional GDP 
  
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat. 
 
The panel on the left indicates that complexity has increased over time as measured by the number and 
the spectrum of socio-economic indicators taken into consideration.16 Furthermore, with the purpose 
of tackling more horizontal challenges, which partially deviates from the primary objective of wealth 
convergence – such as climate change and migration – the Commission proposed the introduction of 
new criteria to be taken into account when calculating funds allocation 
The panel on the right shows two key elements: the weight put on regional GDP has fallen over time 
and the difference across different ‘classes’ of countries has widened considerably, at least if measured 
in relative terms. For example, the first incarnation of the Berlin formula foresaw a weight of 4.1 on the 
regional prosperity gap for regions in the poorest member states and a weight of 2.7 on the regional 
prosperity gap in the richest MSs – a ratio of about 1:0.7. By contrast, the formula proposed by the 
Commission foresees a weight of 2.7 on the regional prosperity gap in the poorest MSs and only 0.9 for 
the richest. A ratio of 3:1. This implies that if one compares two regions with the same (low) GDP per 
capita, but located in two different MSs, under the new MFF one would find that regions located in a 
poor member state (GNI below 82% of EU average) would receive roughly three times as much as 
another region, ceteris paribus, but located in a rich MS (GNI above the EU average). Under the original 
Berlin formula, the region located in the poorer country would have received only about 50% more than 
the one located in the rich country. 
The ‘nationalisation’ of the regional allocations via the modulation of the weight on regional GDP 
according to the prosperity of the MS had already started in 2007, but the proposals by the Commission 
would represent another very important step.  
The strengthening of the national effect is not offset by the other indicators mentioned above, which 
are measured at the regional level, because GDP remains by far the most relevant indicator, driving 
more than 80% of cohesion policy funds allocation.17 But, as pointed out, the decline on the weight of 
prosperity gap has been less pronounced for poorer member states, implying that the ‘regional’ policy 
of the EU has de facto become a policy aiming mainly at helping poorer member states. It is thus 
becoming less regional and more national.  
                                                          
16 See Appendix. 
17 Allocation of Cohesion policy funding to Member States for 2021-2027, ECA. 
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Finally, the Commission proposes to modify the criteria to set the maximum and minimum allowed 
regional allocations. 
Within the present programming period, caps to structural finds allocation are used to avoid excessive 
or insufficient concentration of resources. For the new Commission proposal, caps are set as follows: 18 
Table 2: Caps 
CAP 2014-2020 Conditions CAP 2021-2027 (proposed) Conditions 
GDP caps 
2.35% of GDP  
 
Average real GDP growth 
2008-2010 higher than 1% 
2.3% of GDP  
 
GNI per capita < 
60% of EU average 
 
2.59% of GDP Average real GDP growth 
2008-2010 lower than 1% 
1.85% of GDP GNI per capita 
60%-65% of EU 
average 
  1.55% of GDP GNI per capita > 
65% of EU average 
“Previous period” caps 
MS cannot receive more 
than 110% of its allocation 
for the 2007-2013 period 
 MS cannot receive more than 
108% of its allocation for the 
2014-2020 period 
- 
  MS cannot receive more than 
its allocation for the 2014-2020 
period 
GNI per capita > 
120% of EU 
average 
Source: Common Provisions Regulation 1303/2013 and Common Provisions Regulation proposal COM(2018) 321 final. 
 
Furthermore, it has always been deemed politically inconvenient if EU funding were to change too 
abruptly. This is why there were always some rules concerning changes in classification or when the 
pure application of the rules were to lead to large changes because of rapid changes in the relative 
income of regions or countries. This is also the case for the next MFF, where the Commission proposes 
‘safety nets’ that are more generous than the ones in the current MFF as follows (Table 3). 
Table 3: Safety nets 
Safety net 2014-2020 Safety net 2021-2027 
MS cannot receive less than 55% of its allocation for 
2007-2013 period 
MS cannot receive less than 76% of its allocation for 
2014-2020 period 
TR cannot receive less than they would if they were 
MDR 
TR cannot receive less than they would if they were MDR 
Regions that lost their LDR status cannot receive less 
than 60% of their annual allocation for the 
Investment for jobs and growth goal in the 2014-
2020 programming period 
Regions that lost their LDR status cannot receive less 
than 60% of their annual allocation for the Investment 
for jobs and growth goal in the 2014-2020 programming 
period 
Source: Common Provisions Regulation 1303/2013 and Common Provisions Regulation proposal COM(2018) 321 final. 
  
                                                          
18 See Appendix for a detailed description. 
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Although the Commission proposes a reduction in the allowed negative variation amplitude relative to 
the previous period allocation, there still remains a pronounced asymmetry between the positive and 
negative variation bands. The maximum negative variation is proposed to be reduced from 45% to 24% 
and the maximum positive variation from 10% to 8%. This is relevant because, in our calculations, 
previous period caps seem to be much more binding than GDP caps. 
That said, the amount allocated by the final inter-institutional agreements on the multiannual budget 
are likely to diverge to some extent from the theoretical allocation suggested by the proposed changes 
to the Berlin formula as the result of political negotiations, or the Council may require the formula to be 
amended.  
Allocation MFF 2021-2027 and scenarios 
In order to analyse the implications of the proposed changes to the Berlin formula one needs to 
calculate region by region the amount that would be allocated under the proposed new rules.  
In the calculation we use the theoretically latest data available before the start of each programming 
period, therefore 2006, 2013 and 2020. The 2020 data must of course be based on projections and are 
calculated using growth rates forecasted by AMECO for GDP19 and GNI; for all other indicators forecasts 
are calculated by applying the average growth rate experienced from 2014 to 2018 to 2018 data. For 
the projections for the forthcoming MFF we use EU-27 averages to take Brexit into account. 
We use these calculations for two purposes: first, we check whether for the two past MFFs (starting 
2006 and 2013) our calculations based on the Berlin formula yield results that are close to the outcome. 
This allows us to establish whether the Berlin formula was applied in reality (and whether our 
calculations are materially correct). The calculations for the 2021-27 period allow us to forecast the 
allocations per region Italy would receive under the proposed new formula.  
On the first count, we find that the Berlin formula happened to be a very good predictor of the real 
allocation of EU cohesion policy funds to member states. When regressing20 predictions calculated via 
the Berlin method on the real allocations, one finds 96-98% of the variations in real allocation can be 
explained by the Berlin method. The correlation between calculated and real values is extremely high 
(0.98-0.99).  
There are of course some outliers, but they concern only a few MS, while for the majority the difference 
between predicted and actual allocations is limited, around 0-20%. These differences can be due to 
many reasons. For example, changes can be agreed in the negotiation phase; discrepancies may also 
result from the fact that growth projections at the start of the MFF turned out to be wrong and different 
reference years or the absorption of funds may have been sub-optimal.  
Notwithstanding the limitations mentioned, we consider the Berlin method a reliable tool to depict 
different scenarios that may occur within the next multiannual programming period. Furthermore, the 
discrepancy between predicted and real allocation for Italy is very limited (between 1% and 8%). 
  
                                                          
19 National forecasted growth rates of GDP, measured in PPS, are assumed to apply indistinctly to all regions of 
the nation. 
20 Simple cross-section OLS regression. 
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Table 4: Berlin method – calculations vs real allocations21 
 MFF 2007-2013 MFF 2014-2020 MFF 2021-202722 
Data (average) - regional classification 2000-2002 2008-2010 2014-2016 
Data 2006 2013 2020 
Average prediction-real allocation discrepancy 
(countries) 
29% 24% 15% 
Prediction-real allocation discrepancy (Total EU) 10% 2% 2% 
Italy prediction-real allocation discrepancy 8% 1% 4% 
Correlation prediction-real allocation 0.99 0.98 0.98 
R2 regression prediction-real allocation 0.98 0.96 0.96 
Coefficient regression prediction-real allocation 0.97 1.09 1.08 
Source: Own calculations based on Commission data. 
 
According to the prescriptions indicated in the proposal submitted by the Commission, we calculate the 
theoretical regional cohesion policy funds allocation for the programming period 2021-2027. 
Figure 10 below shows the relative distribution of cohesion funds per capita for the coming MFF. The 
spectrum of colours is determined looking at the maximum and the minimum allocation and then 
shaded accordingly. In the left panel minimum and maximum allocation refer to the whole EU, whereas 
in the right panel they refer only to Italy. 
Figure 10: Structural funds per capita 
                                                 EU-27                                                                  Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and authors’ elaboration based on the ‘Berlin method’. 
 
The distribution of Structural Funds per head remains strongly concentrated in eastern countries. Lots 
of resources are also directed to Greece, Portugal and the southern regions of Italy and Spain. The fact 
that the shades of yellow are not easily distinguishable in richer regions means that the variations within 
region groups (LDR, TR, MDR) is much less significant if compared with cross-group variation. This 
                                                          
21 Calculations take into accounts the following Funds: ERDF, ESF, YEI, CF, ETC (EARDF, EMFF are not considered in 
the analysis). 
22 Based on EU27 data (the proposed Berlin Formula assumes Brexit). The predicated-real allocation discrepancy 
is relative to the Commission calculations, not real allocations. The discrepancy is most likely due to the fact that 
we use 2020 forecasted data. 
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reflects the relevance of regional classification criteria and confirms the major implication that widening 
the group eligible for transitional support proposed for the MFF 2021-2027 will have. 
However, the maps in Figure 10 make it possible to appreciate how allocations may differ significantly 
even within the same regional grouping, in per capita terms, mirroring the relative wealth of regions. If 
looking at the real allocation the distribution is more homogeneous. 
Looking to Italy, one notices a strong concentration on transfers to the southern regions. The majority 
of resources are directed towards Sicilia, Calabria and Campania, which are expected to receive roughly 
half of cohesion funds to Italy over the coming programming period, corresponding to about 18 billion.23 
Looking at total allocation (not per capita), Campania, Sicilia and Puglia are among the main beneficiaries 
in Europe, respectively at the 4, 5 and 12 position. 
According to our calculations, Italy may expect to receive a similar amount of Structural Funds transfers 
in the next MFF as in the current programming period. Notwithstanding, there may be relevant 
distributional differences based on the actual allocation methodology that will be adopted. The maps in 
Figure 11 show the difference, at the regional level, between actual allocations in MFF 2014-2020 and 
the expected one for the coming MFF 2021-2027, both expressed in 2020 prices. We focus only on 
significant changes, defined as more than 10% variations with respect to the current programming 
period. Regions shaded in green will receive more funds, while red and grey mean respectively less 
transfers and no sizeable variations (below +/- 10%). The first panel shows the allocation for Italian 
regions if the current formula remains in place. For most regions the allocation will remain similar, 8 
regions will receive more and only 3 will see their funds allocation reduced. The second panel shows the 
allocation if the proposed formula is approved. All centre-north regions would receive more funds than 
in the 2014-2020 programming period, while 5 southern regions would receive less. The minor 
allocation to Sicilia, Calabria, Basilicata, Campania and Puglia reflects the proposed reduction in the 
weight attached to GDP as driver of allocations. Panel 3 shows which regions would benefit and which 
would be penalised if the proposed formula is applied, relative to the scenario in which the current 
formula is not modified. Results highlight that the Mezzogiorno will be penalised. 
Figure 11: MFFs allocation – scenarios24         
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and authors’ elaboration based on the ‘Berlin method’. 
 
                                                          
23 We consider only ERDF and ESF+, as regionally allocated funds 
24 In order to ensure comparability, allocation for the period 2014-2020 include only ERDF, ESF (CF and ECT are 
included only to calculate caps and safety nets) 
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Finally, in Figure 12 we propose an additional analysis in order to assess how variations within the new 
proposed formula might affect funds distribution in Italy. The map plots which regions would benefit if 
the current regional classification methodology (TR defined as those whose GDP per capita, measured 
in PPS, is between 75%-90% of EU average, instead of 75%-100%, as proposed by the Commission) was 
to be applied to the proposed formula. Although the allocation for most of the regions would be 
unaltered, there would be major changes in few more developed regions (Emilia-Romagna, Trentino 
and Friuli-Venezia Giulia). Marche clearly would be worse-off in this scenario, since it would be classified 
as MDR and not TR. As aforementioned, different regional groups, results of different classification 
criteria, produce different group averages, and, hence, diverse allocations. 
Figure 12: The impact of different criteria for regional categorisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and authors’ elaboration based on the ‘Berlin method’. 
 
 
Our results can be summarised in the following tabular form: 
Table 5: Allocation for Italy (ERDF, ESF+)25 
 MFF 2014-2021 MFF 2021-2027 
Old formula €34 bn (€48bn)* €37 bn (€51 bn)* 
Proposed formula - €35 bn 
* Figure in brackets indicate amount if caps did not apply. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat. 
  
                                                          
25 See appendix for detailed regional allocation; allocations are expressed in 2020 prices (2% yearly inflation is 
assumed); Previous period allocation caps take into account also YEI transfers (which the Commission proposed to 
be included in the ESF (creating the ESF+) for the next programming period; Allocation for the EU27 would be 5% 
lower if the proposed formula will substitute the old one (€270 billion instead of €285 billion). 
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We account for the caps which stipulate that the increase from the previous period allocation cannot 
be higher than 8% (in the proposed formula) and 10% (in the old formula). Numbers in parenthesis show 
the allocations if caps did not apply. The caps on changes, which are tighter for increases than for falls 
in allocation, thus play an important point for a country like Italy where the income of per capita of most 
regions has declined considerably over the last 7 years. 
Table 5 shows that the allocation for Italy in the MFF 2021-2027 under the new formula would be 
€35 billion. This is not substantially different from the sum the country was allocated during the last 
period. The new formula with its lower weight on GDP implies prima facie a substantial fall in the 
allocation as the ‘old’ formula would have given Italy about €51 billion. But even under the old formula 
the caps (limits on increases) would have prevented a substantial increase in the allocations. The 
difference between the old formula and the one is thus relatively minor (€37 billion versus €35 billion). 
However, the new formula would lead to a substantial reallocation within Italy: as shown in Figure 13, 
the southern regions would receive less and the northern and central regions would receive more.  The 
reason for this is that the weight on GDP is lower, leading to a loss for the southern regions, but this is 
made up by increases for the other regions on account of the unemployment and other indicators. 
Figure 13: Distributional consequences of the proposed formula  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The bottom line of our analysis is that Italy, according to the Commission proposal, will receive slightly 
more funds relative to the current MFF (only about €1 billion spread over 7 years). Nonetheless, Italy 
would be penalised by the new proposed methodology and by Brexit (see Box) in overall net 
contributions. Southern Italian regions would receive, marginally, less than in the current programming 
period. 
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Box 2: The impact of Brexit 
There exist many analyses of the impact of Brexit on the overall budget of the EU because of 
the loss of a large net payer. We propose a different exercise. We analyse how Brexit affects 
the allocation of Structural Funds under the Berlin formula in the sense that with Brexit this 
formula has to be calculated using EU-27 averages whereas without Brexit one needs to use 
EU-28 data. 
Figure 14: The impact of Brexit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and authors’ elaboration based on the ‘Berlin method’. 
Figure 14 shows the theoretical allocation of funds if the UK had remained part of the European 
Union. This is clearly a simplified exercise: we apply the formula proposed by the Commission 
and we include the UK in the calculation for the distribution, ceteris paribus. The only significant 
difference is the use of regional GDP measured in PPS relative to the EU-28, not EU-27. The 
simulation highlights that LDR and TR regions lose from Brexit scenario, while MDR benefit. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the PPS measure of GDP is calculated relative to the average 
EU price level. Brexit will imply lower EU average prices, hence increasing the GDP-PPS of 
poorer regions, eventually leading to lower allocations. Moreover, the UK being richer than the 
EU average, Brexit will lower the average EU GDP per capita in PPS, reducing the wealth gap of 
less developed regions, and hence their calculated allocations. This broadly explains why LDR 
and TR lose from Brexit. Dealing with MDR regions, it is more difficult to disentangle which 
criteria play a major role in driving the changes. The allocation to MDR depends on the 
performance relative to the group averages. Brexit will affect the averages and therefore the 
final allocations. 
Theoretical allocation vs actual payments 
When dealing with the cohesion policy, it is important to bear in mind that allocations do not necessarily 
translate into actual transfers. In fact, the only way Structural Funds can be unleashed is through project 
approvals. Eventually, the amount actually transferred by the EU to individual regions will depend on 
the number, size and quality of projects proposed. The initial theoretical allocation serves as a ceiling. 
In the previous section we conducted an analysis using the Berlin method to calculate the theoretical 
amount of funds each EU region is expected to receive within the coming programming period. Although 
we highlighted how the Berlin formula is a good predictor of actual allocation, it is still not clear whether 
the methodology guarantees accuracy when it comes to actual payments. One way to verify that 
hypothesis is to regress actual payments on the variables indicated by the Berlin formula as the drivers 
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of allocation and compare estimated coefficients with the fixed parameters of the formula. We conduct 
the analysis using data relative to the programming period 2007-2013, the latest available. Results are 
shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Berlin formula parameters vs estimated coefficients 
VARIABLES 
Convergence Objective regions 
Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective regions 
Allocation Payments Allocation Payments 
     
Wealth gap 1.00 0.75***   
  (0.04)   
Unemployment 700.00 899.10** 0.20 0.16*** 
  (414.65)  (0.06) 
Population   0.50 0.01 
    (0.30) 
Employment   0.15 0.13*** 
    (0.05) 
Low educated employment   0.10 0.64*** 
    (0.23) 
Caps adjustment 1.00 0.87*** 1.05 0.25 
  (0.06)  (0.56) 
Observations 70 70 138 136 
R-squared 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.60 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results refers to regions eligible for the Convergence Objective and Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective regions. Unfortunately, the formulae applied to allocate funds to regions eligible 
for transitional support for the MFF 2007-2013 are not suitable for the analysis.  
The Berlin method seems to be a rather good predictor of actual regional payments for Convergence 
Objective regions (which are defined as LDR in the new Commission proposal). The R2 of the regression 
is extremely high, indicating that GDP and unemployment, if properly adjusted, can explain more than 
90% of the variations in payments. Estimated coefficients are relatively similar to the formula 
parameters, although, as one would expect, somewhat lower. Results are in line with the fact that all 
EU countries have received between 90%-100% of allocated funds in the 2007-2013 programming 
period. The results for Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective regions indicate that the 
Berlin method is a less accurate predictor for wealthier regions. The indicated allocation drivers explain 
only 60% of the variations and estimated coefficients are less precise.  
While the formula may explain the allocation, more controversial is to understand the reasons for 
regional underperformance in terms of growth and employment. For that, the work on the role of 
governance and structural barriers to development is more relevant. Quality of strategies, governance 
and the right framework for development are important. Disentangling the institutional, structural and 
macro-economic factors to understand performance is no easy feat. This is clearly discussed in the 
impact assessment by the Italian Senate,26 which analyses to great detail the impact of cohesion policies 
in European and Italy. According to the document, governance has a role to play, but other factors are 
also at play and the level of development of regions is in itself related to the quality of governance. 
Several factors are at play, and the report highlights that the structural disadvantages in the southern 
                                                          
26 Senato della Republica (2018), ‘The Impact of Cohesion Policies in Europe and Italy’, Impact Assessment Office, 
Documento di valutazione No11. 
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regions are too serious for the cohesion policy to compensate them, requiring national action. It is 
important to highlight the fact that EU spending in the south of Italy (or the Mezzogiorno) is only a small 
fraction of the primary government spending there (4.8% in 2013-2015), far lower than in new member 
states. The assessment calls for quantitative and qualitative improvements in national policies.  
Research and innovation 
As documented above, an increasing allocation of the EU budget has gone to ‘other’ items, aside from 
agriculture and regional funds. One key other item is support for research and science. There is general 
agreement that the competitiveness of the EU economy requires a substantial effort in upgrading 
European spending on science, research and technology. The European Commission proposed an 
increase, both in absolute and relative terms, in R&I spending. Resources in this field, are allocated 
strictly based on performance.  
Figure 15 shows the distribution of one key element of spending under this heading, namely Horizon 
2020 projects. The distribution of these projects and funds at the regional level is important because 
local R&I can contribute to create an ecosystem of innovation which is likely to foster regional growth. 
Valero and Van Reenen (2019) show that universities have a significant impact on growth at the regional 
level, with positive spill-over effects to neighbouring regions. 
In an estimation performed by the OECD of the impacts on the economy of the EU 6th and 7th Framework 
Programme, each euro spent in those programmes have increased the value added in the business 
sector by €13.27 This is a clear indication of the importance of R&I spillovers. 
Figure 15: Horizon 2020 in EU regions 
 
 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on Commission data. 
 
                                                          
27 Presented in Box 10 of page 30 of the Commission staff working paper accompanying the impact assessment of 
the Horizon 2020 proposals (SEC(2011) 1427 final) of 30 November 2011. 
Distribution – deciles Distribution – % of GDP 
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Figure 15 shows the distribution of H2020 funds in EU regions in two ways.28 The left panel plots the 
distribution in deciles, whereas the right as percent of GDP. There is a significant concentration of 
resources in richer regions, as 20% of regions receive almost 80% of resources. Figure 16 then provides 
the same information in more detail for Italian regions and Provinces. The panel on the left highlights 
how only few regions stand out and the panel on the right indicates that even within regions funds are 
concentrated in a small number of provinces. The bottom panel provides details of EU R&D payments 
highlighting that only 25% or regions are above average, reinforcing the image of concentration. 
Figure 16: R&D performance of Italian regions and provinces 
 
                     
Source: European Commission data and authors’ elaboration. 
 
Figure 17. Horizon 2020 Total funding (% of GDP), Italian regions 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Commission data. 
                                                          
28 Most EU funded research and innovation projects involve multiple partners throughout the EU and beyond. It 
is thus difficult to determine precisely where the funds are ultimately spent. The data presented here is based on 
the country/region of residence of the leader in the projects and thus cannot show where the beneficiaries are 
located. However, the leader in a project usually has the highest share in the project budget. Another reason why 
the distribution of project leadership across regions should still give an indication of the distribution of the funding 
is that the distribution of partners should be similar across projects and countries.  
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Figure 18 shows that the Italian performance in R&D has been following a downward trend in the last 
three programming periods and this decline has been even more pronounced than the fall of Italy’s GDP 
per capita relative to the EU average. Fortunately, the rate the decline has slowed down and the curve 
has flattened over the last 6-7 years. A key target for the coming MFF should be to invert this trend and 
ensure a better participation of Italian research institutions in EU programmes. 
However, it is important to place a note of caution that the research sector benefits from concentration 
and the presence of strong international links and top researchers. A policy to create many institutions 
of low quality would weaken overall national performance and strength of the centres.  
Figure 18: Italian R&D performance over time  
 
Source: European Commission data and authors’ elaboration. 
Conclusions 
Any analysis of regional policy must consider the tension between the fact that, in the end, the MFF is 
essentially a political process, and the very technical details of the regulations which govern the 
allocation of Structural Funds. 
This contribution has focused on the potential implications for Italy of the proposals of the Commission 
to change the formula for the allocation of Structural Funds across regions and countries. The old 
Brussels adage is that the ‘Commission proposes, Council disposes’. It thus remains to be seen whether 
these proposals will survive the political negotiations which may be concluded under the German 
Presidency in the second half of 2020. The Parliament has to give consent, which is not assured as the 
wedge between the positions of the two legislative arms has widened compared to the previous MFF. 
Our broad conclusions are that the traditional spending items, cohesion and agriculture are on a 
declining trend. This represents a challenge for Italy, whose receipts from the EU budget have been 
dominated by these two budget lines. 
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In more detail we find that Italian regions should be allocated more funding for cohesion because they 
have become relatively poorer, but under the rules of the new proposal that increase is largely 
neutralised. 
One of the aspects, which the level of funding cannot address, is the quality of the local strategies and 
governance. There is a need to undertake structural reforms and redirect the efforts to investments 
building the base for a more resilient and diversified economy. The easy returns to investment from 
building basic infrastructure have long been reaped. The key aim for policymakers should now be to 
strengthen the competitiveness of Italy’s regions by investing notably in research and innovation. 
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Appendix 
Table 7: Data clustering based on multiannual budget headings 
 MFF 2000-2006 MFF 2007-2013 MFF 2014-2020 MFF 2021-2027 
CAP 1 – Agriculture 
 
2 - EAGGF 
2.0.1 - Market 
related 
expenditure and 
direct aids 
 
2.0.2 - Rural 
development 
2.0.1 - European 
Agricultural Guarantee 
Fund (EAGF) - Market 
related expenditure 
and direct payments 
 
2.0.2 European 
Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development 
(EAFRD) 
3.8 - European 
Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund 
(EAGF) + European 
Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development 
(EAFRD) 
SF 2 - Structural 
actions (only ERDF, 
ESF, CF) 
1.2 - Cohesion for 
growth and 
employment 
1.2 Economic, social 
and territorial cohesion 
 
2. Cohesion and 
values 
R&D 3 - Internal Policies 
_ Research and 
technological 
development 
1.1.1 - Seventh 
Research 
framework 
programme 
1.1.31 - The 
Framework Programme 
for Research and 
Innovation (Horizon 
2020) 
1.1 – Horizon Europe 
Other Tot – (CAP + SF) Tot – (CAP + SF) Tot – (CAP + SF) Tot – (CAP + SF) 
Source: European Commission data (https://ec.europa.eu/budget/graphs/revenue_expediture.html). 
  
30 
Table 8: Cohesion Policy funds allocation determinants: Evolution over time 
Programming 
period / Regional 
classification 
MFF 2007-2013 MFF 2014-2020 MFF 2021-2027 
Less developed 
regions 
 
 
1. Prosperity gap 
2. Unemployment 
 
1. Prosperity gap 
2. Unemployment 
 
1. Prosperity gap 
2. Unemployment 
 
3. Youth unemployment 
4. Low educated  
5. Greenhouse gas 
emission 
6. Migration 
 
Transition 
regions 
 
 
1. Prosperity gap 
2. Unemployment 
 
1. Prosperity gap 
2. Unemployment 
 
1. Prosperity gap 
2. Unemployment 
 
3. Youth unemployment 
4. Low educated  
5. Greenhouse gas 
emission 
6. Migration 
 
More developed 
regions 
 
 
1. Population 
2. Unemployment 
3. Employment 
4. Population density 
5. Prosperity gap 
 
6. Low educated  
 
1. Population 
2. Unemployment 
3. Employment 
4. Population density 
5. Prosperity gap 
 
6. Tertiary educated  
 
 
7. Early leavers 
 
1. Population 
2. Unemployment 
3. Employment 
4. Population density 
5. Prosperity gap 
 
6. Tertiary educated  
 
 
7. Early leavers 
 
8. Greenhouse gas 
emission 
9. Migration 
 
Note: 
 Less developed regions: GDP per capita (PPS) less than 75% of EU average 
 Transition regions: GDP per capita (PPS) between 75% and 90% (100% in MFF 2021-2027) of EU average 
 More developed regions: GDP per capita (PPS) more than 100% of EU average 
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Table 9: Historic of allocations and scenarios for the future29 
 
                                                          
29 Allocations are results of our calculations based on the Berlin method, not the actual realized allocations nor 
real payments. Allocations are expressed in 2020 EUR million. 2% fixed yearly inflation rate is assumed. 
Regions 
MFF 2007-
2013 
MFF 2014-
2020 
MFF 2021-2027 
Scenario 1 – 
No formula 
change 
Scenario 2 – 
Proposed 
formula 
Scenario 3 – 
Proposed 
formula + 
old regional 
classification 
Scenario 4 – 
Proposed 
formula + no 
Brexit 
Nord-Ovest 2,372 1,633 1,707 3,603 3,351 2,305 
Liguria 432 176 276 516 487 328 
Lombardia 1,132 891 865 1,937 1,785 1244 
Piemonte 792 553 552 1,118 1,050 713 
Valle d'Aosta 16 13 15 31 29 20 
Nord-Est 1,643 1,028 894 1,810 1,615 1,142 
Emilia-Romagna 503 343 277 564 483 349 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia 
227 110 112 205 184 131 
Provincia 
Autonoma di 
Bolzano 
62 43 27 62 57 40 
Provincia 
Autonoma di 
Trento 
67 42 29 51 44 33 
Veneto 784 490 448 929 846 589 
Centro 2,931 1,548 2,257 3,709 3,406 2,480 
Lazio 1,780 859 1,218 2,182 2,041 1,384 
Marche 290 208 214 417 349 239 
Toscana 663 378 419 778 714 495 
Umbria 199 103 406 332 302 362 
Sud 15,440 20,821 21,004 17,122 17,080 20,038 
Abruzzo 503 425 440 543 502 563 
Basilicata 692 642 586 470 470 602 
Calabria 4,037 3,474 3,652 2,853 2,853 3,319 
Campania 2,514 9,636 9,775 7,834 7,834 9,127 
Molise 162 164 387 298 298 377 
Puglia 7,533 6,480 6,164 5,123 5,123 6,050 
Isole 10,081 9,422 11,134 8,947 8,947 10,420 
Sardegna 1,319 1,236 1,985 1,704 1,704 2,023 
Sicilia 8,762 8,186 9,149 7,243 7,243 8,397 
Italy 32,467 34,453 36,996 35,190 34,399 36,385 
